
CONTENTS

Acknowledgments	v
Introduction	ix
I. Limits, Continuity and Robustness	1
1. Subgame-Perfect Equilibria of Finite- and Infinite-Horizon Games <i>D. Fudenberg and D. K. Levine</i>	3
2. Limit Games and Limit Equilibria <i>D. Fudenberg and D. K. Levine</i>	21
3. Open-Loop and Closed-Loop Equilibria in Dynamic Games with Many Players <i>D. Fudenberg and D. K. Levine</i>	41
4. Finite Player Approximations to a Continuum of Players <i>D. Fudenberg and D. K. Levine</i>	59
5. On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements <i>D. Fudenberg, D. M. Kreps and D. K. Levine</i>	67
6. When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible? <i>D. Fudenberg, D. K. Levine and W. Pesendorfer</i>	95
II. Reputation Effects	121
7. Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player <i>D. Fudenberg and D. K. Levine</i>	123

8. Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed <i>D. Fudenberg and D. K. Levine</i>	143
9. Maintaining a Reputation Against a Long-Lived Opponent <i>M. Celentani, D. Fudenberg, D. K. Levine and W. Pesendorfer</i>	163
10. When is Reputation Bad? <i>J. Ely, D. Fudenberg and D. K. Levine</i>	177
III. Repeated Games	207
11. The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information <i>D. Fudenberg and E. Maskin</i>	209
12. The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information <i>D. Fudenberg, D. K. Levine and E. Maskin</i>	231
13. Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players <i>D. Fudenberg and D. K. Levine</i>	275
14. An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information <i>D. Fudenberg and D. K. Levine</i>	309
15. The Nash-Threats Folk Theorem with Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games <i>D. Fudenberg and D. K. Levine</i>	331
16. Perfect Public Equilibrium when Players are Patient <i>D. Fudenberg, D. K. Levine and S. Takahashi</i>	345
17. Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring <i>D. Fudenberg and D. K. Levine</i>	369
Erratum	389