
Introduction: China's Political Elites and Their Challenges

This book tackles the issue of governance in China. “The most important political distinction among countries”, Samuel P. Huntington observed in 1968, “concerns not their form of government but their degree of government”.¹ “The differences between democracy and dictatorship”, he continued, “are less than the differences between those countries whose politics embodies consensus, community, legitimacy, organization, effectiveness, stability, and those countries whose politics is deficient in these qualities”.² Interestingly, Huntington’s political theory of governance is astonishingly similar to Deng Xiaoping’s “cat theory” of economic development — it does not matter whether a cat is white or black; it is a good cat as long as it catches mice (in other words, it does not matter whether an economic policy is socialist or capitalist; it is a good policy as long as it promotes economic growth). To reformulate Huntington’s theory in Deng’s parlance, one may get that it does not matter whether a government is democratic or authoritarian; it is a good government as long as it governs.

“LAME DUCK PHENOMENON”

Unfortunately, many democracies, new democracies in particular, have been increasingly faced with the challenge of effective governance.

Winners of democratic elections have increasingly suffered from a “lame duck phenomenon” in which newly inaugurated leaders are often challenged by opposition leaders and protested against by citizens for their inability to adequately address social and economic issues.

President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (born February 19, 1953) of Argentina, the first female to be elected as president in the history of her country,³ was being labeled a lame duck president only half a year in office because of her defeat over a tax bill in the Senate.⁴ A popular presidential candidate who secured 45.3 percent of the vote on October 28, 2007, Cristina Kirchner got into conflict with Argentinean farmers in March 2008 when she raised taxes on agricultural exports. Within just over 100 days in office, she was faced with the largest protest in Argentina in six years.⁵ Her presumed loyalists defected, and her popularity tumbled.

President Lee Myung-bak (born December 19, 1941) of the Republic of Korea (South Korea), once hailed as a potential savior of South Korea's troubled economy, received calls for resignation amid the country's largest anti-government protests in 20 years over a US beef deal, barely two months after his inauguration on February 25, 2008.⁶ The winner of a landslide victory with 48.7 percent of the vote, Lee's approval ratings plummeted from 75.1 percent on February 23, 2008 to only 17.2 percent on June 2, 2008, at the end of his first 100 days in office.⁷ His entire cabinet resigned a few days thereafter.

Unfortunately, these are not isolated examples of weak governments as a result of democratic elections. Massive protests and parliamentary meltdowns have occurred in the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, and other democracies.⁸ The Filipinos, having ousted President Jose Marcelo Ejercito (born April 19, 1937) through peaceful street demonstrations in January 2001, have been pressuring their current president, Ms. Maria Gloria Macaraeg Macapagal-Arroyo (born April 5, 1947), to step down since her inauguration on June 30, 2004.

In Malaysia, after having led the ruling coalition Barisan Nasional (BN) to its worst election result in March 2008, Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (born November 26, 1939) was called to

step down because of rising fuel and food prices. His designated successor, Deputy Prime Minister Najib Abdul Razak (born July 22, 1953), was accused of being involved in the 2006 killing of a Mongolian woman, Altantuya Shaariibuu, and the opposition leader, Anwar Ibrahim (born August 10, 1947), was charged with sodomy by a 23-year-old male aide.

In Thailand, Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej (born June 23, 1935) faced opposition accusations of incompetence, mismanagement, and yielding national sovereignty, mass protests, and a no-confidence vote in the Parliament barely five months after he became the head of a newly reconstituted government. An opposition party, the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD), occupied the grounds of the prime minister's office on August 26, 2008, demanding him to move the business of government elsewhere. Samak Sundaravej was forced to step down as the prime minister on September 9, 2008 when a court ruled that he had violated the Constitution by accepting payments for his appearance in a television cooking show while in office. Somchai Wongsawat (born August 31, 1947), the brother-in-law of fugitive ex-Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, became the Prime Minister on September 9, 2008, upon the Constitutional Court's decision that the premiership of Samak Sundaravej had been terminated. He was elected Prime Minister on September 17, 2008 by the National Assembly, receiving 298 favorable votes against the 163 votes for Abhisit Vejjajiva (born August 4, 1964). But the PAD besieged the Parliament building on October 7, 2008 and then took control of Bangkok's main airport on November 26, 2008. On December 2, 2008, the Thai Constitutional Court ruled that Prime Minister Somchai should be banned from politics for at least five years and that his party should be dissolved over election fraud.⁹ The airport closures left more than 300,000 tourists stranded in Thailand and cost the economy huge amounts in lost revenues and the country its reputation as a tourist destination.

Moreover, as the 2008 24-Nation Pew Global Attitudes Survey reveals, majorities in major Western democracies are not satisfied with the way things are going in their own countries either. In Germany,

63 percent of the people are dissatisfied with the country's direction while only 34 percent are satisfied. In Britain, the split between the dissatisfied and the satisfied is 65 percent versus 30 percent. The Americans are much less optimistic about the way things are going in the United States: 70 percent are dissatisfied while only 23 percent are satisfied.¹⁰ The French are even a bit more pessimistic: 71 percent are not satisfied while 29 percent are. In Japan, 74 percent are dissatisfied with their country direction while 23 percent are satisfied.¹¹ Clearly, people in these democracies are not happy about how their countries are being governed.

Finally, a WorldPublicOpinion.org poll of 20 nations around the world in 2008 finds few democrats as inspiring world leaders.¹² British Prime Minister Gordon Brown performed the best with an average score of 30 (without Great Britain). However, only six countries have confidence in him to do the right thing regarding world affairs while 11 nations do not have confidence in him as a world leader. The British are divided about him.¹³ French President Nicolas Sarkozy fares much worse. His average score (without France) is only 26. Among the 19 countries (excluding France) surveyed, four give him positive scores while 15 dismiss him as a world leader. In some Asian countries such as South Korea, China, and India, more favor him than not. And more Nigerians (47 percent) are positive about him than not (33 percent). In his home country, 54 percent of the people distrust him while 44 percent have confidence in him. American President George W. Bush is one of the least trusted leaders in the world, next only to Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf. His average score is only 23 points (without the United States). Sixteen of the 19 nations surveyed do not have confidence in Bush, while only two countries (Nigeria and India) have confidence in Bush to do the right thing regarding world affairs. In Thailand, people are divided about Bush. In his own country, the United States, a majority (56 percent) do not trust him. Worse still, "Bush" has become a synonym for "lame duck leader".¹⁴

A more worrying sign for democratic advocates is that this distrust is nothing personal. Few Americans, for instance, have faith in any of the three major institutions of their own democratic system.

According to a Gallup poll taken on June 9–12, 2008 asking people how much confidence they had in a list of American institutions, none of the three branches of the federal government received high ratings. In the favorable categories of “great deal” and “quite lot”, the U.S. Supreme Court received a combined rate of 32 percent; the Presidency 26 percent; and Congress 12 percent.¹⁵ In contrast, Americans have much more confidence in the military and the police, institutions of force. The military received a favorable rating of 71 percent and the police 58 percent.¹⁶

AUTHORITARIAN RESURGENCE

While democratic leaders suffer from the “lame duck phenomenon”, leaders of authoritarian regimes (or “dictators” in Western parlance) seem to elicit more confidence.¹⁷ According to the same WorldPublicOpinion.org poll of 20 nations conducted in 2008, Russian Leader Vladimir Putin, President of Russia before May 2008 and now Prime Minister of Russia, scores 32 points on average (excluding Russia). Five countries (China, 75 percent versus 11 percent; Ukraine, 59 percent versus 20 percent; South Korea, 54 percent versus 40 percent; Iran, 48 percent versus 27 percent; and India, 44 percent versus 18 percent) have confidence in him as a world leader, while 11 countries do not trust him. Thais and Nigerians are divided. Putin is very popular at home. Eighty percent of Russians trust him to do the right thing regarding world affairs.

Similarly, Chinese President Hu Jintao also scores higher than both Bush and Sarkozy. His average score without China is 28 points. Five countries (Nigeria, 58 percent versus 25 percent; South Korea, 56 percent versus 41 percent; Iran, 52 percent versus 16 percent; Azerbaijan, 37 percent versus 30 percent; and Ukraine, 20 percent versus 13 percent) trust him as a world leader, while 13 countries do not have confidence in him. But Hu is hugely popular in China. Ninety-three percent of the Chinese have confidence in him as a world leader, the highest percentage among all the world leaders surveyed.

Moreover, as the Pew Global Attitudes Survey shows, people under these authoritarian regimes are optimistic about the way things are going in their countries amidst global pessimism. In Russia, 54 percent of the people are satisfied with the way things are going in their country. The Chinese are the most optimistic of all: 86 percent of them are satisfied with their country's direction. In the meantime, large majorities (82 percent) in China also believe their national economic situation is good while only 14 percent think otherwise;¹⁸ and still larger majorities (85 percent) say the future economic situation in China will improve.¹⁹

This positive sentiment shared by a majority in the rising dragon is consistent with China's performance in economic development in the past decades. After rapid economic growth over the past three decades, China has emerged as one of the most important economic powerhouses in the world. By the end of 2007, China had registered a record of continuous growth at the annual rate of 9.7 percent for 30 years. With its GDP at US\$3.76²⁰ trillion in 2007,²⁰ China overtook Germany as the World's third largest economy, after the United States and Japan. In the meantime, China has also become the largest holder of foreign reserves in the world. China's foreign reserves hit the US\$1 trillion mark at the end of 2006²¹ and surged to US\$1.9 trillion in September 2008.²²

CHINA'S FUTURE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Nevertheless, China is also facing daunting problems, partly as a result of its past successes. Rapid industrialization has generated enormous side effects of energy shortage and environmental degradation. The coastal development strategy has substantially enlarged the gap between the eastern provinces and the interior regions. The influx of migrant workers into cities along with the fast pace of urbanization has increased social tensions between native residents and new migrants; and China's increasing integration into the global system has resulted in the massive layoffs of employees of uncompetitive state enterprises. In addition, the urbanites have found themselves being increasingly buried under the "three new

mountains”: medical care, university education, and housing. With more than 80,000 public protests a year as a result of land disputes and other social grievances, China indeed looks very much like a “fragile” power.²³ To this mix, if one adds more explosive issues of Taiwan and Tibet, China seems to be in an imminent danger of collapsing.²⁴

The collapse of China, in fact, could mean two different things. It could mean the collapse of China as a nation-state, as in the case of the Soviet Union in 1991. Or it could simply mean the demise of the political regime under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) while China remains intact as a well-integrated country. For Gordon Chang, the two outcomes are intertwined: the collapse of China is inevitable and China’s inevitable collapse is due to the mismanagement of the CCP. According to him, China’s “roads to ruin” include conflict across the Taiwan Strait, corruption, and accession to the World Trade Organization.²⁵

But for others, collapsing is not necessarily the only possibility for a hopeless China in the near future. According to Minxin Pei, China is also likely to be trapped in transition because of “the self-destructive logic of predatory authoritarianism”.²⁶ “Deteriorating governance and economic performance”, as he puts it, “may be the necessary — but not sufficient — conditions for the emergence of a fatal crisis”.²⁷ The CCP regime may survive for decades if it can use “the same mix of repression, cooptation, and adaptation to maintain an elite-based ruling coalition”.²⁸

A third assessment of China’s future political development is much more optimistic than both the disintegration thesis and the stagnation thesis. The Chinese Communist leadership, as Dali L. Yang presents it, has engineered a series of successful institutional reforms, ultimately amounting to the fundamental transformation of the Chinese state “from a totalistic, unlimited government to a limited government, with its operations moving compulsory supervision to the provision of public services”.²⁹ Although the CCP leadership has promoted governance reforms in order to keep its monopoly on political power, as he further explains, the institutional changes will nevertheless lead to good governance in China and lay the

foundation for an effective democratic polity, “if and when China does become more democratic”.³⁰

CHINA'S POLITICAL ELITES AND THEIR CHALLENGES

A real assessment of China's future political development, however, is not complete without an assessment of China's political elites in the first place. This is where the current volume and its twin, *China's Elite Politics: Political Transition and Power Balancing*, come in.

Instead of a theoretical framework on political transition (the focus of the previous volume), this book will analyze characteristics of political elites and evaluate their ability to deal with crises through four case studies: Snowstorms in the South, the Tibet issue, the Sichuan Earthquake, and the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games.

China's political elites are defined in this study as those who wield political power in the most important political institution in China: the CCP. They are alternate and full members of the CCP's Central Committee. Who these people are and what they do will most likely determine the future of China. Ultimately, it is not so much the fact that these political elites will face challenges of natural disasters and human affairs. It is rather how they deal with these challenges.

CHAPTER OUTLINE

The book is divided into two parts, attempting to answer two interrelated questions: Who governs? How to govern?

Part I answers the “who” question. Chapter 1 introduces the newly reconstituted top leadership in the CCP: the Politburo Standing Committee, the Politburo, the Secretariat, and the Central Military Commission. As a result of political institutionalization, the leadership reshuffles strictly followed a relatively neutral criterion: age 68. Those in the Politburo Standing Committee who reached the retirement age of 68 in 2007 all retired, while those who were below 68 were either retained or promoted. In addition to Huang Ju who passed away in June 2007, Luo Gan, Wu Guanzheng, and Zeng

Qinghong all stepped down from the Politburo Standing Committee due to their age. He Guoqiang and Zhou Yongkang were promoted from the Politburo to the Politburo Standing Committee, and Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang were uplifted to the Politburo Standing Committee from provinces. Similarly, Cao Gangchuan, Wu Yi, Zeng Peiyan, and Zhang Lichang also retired from the Politburo because of their age, and seven new members such as Wang Qishan, Liu Yandong, Li Yuanchao, Wang Yang, Zhang Gaoli, Xu Caihou, and Bo Xilai were introduced to the Seventeenth Politburo. The new Secretariat went through a major reshuffle. Five members exited, and four new members were added. The new members include Xi Jinping, Li Yuanchao, Ling Jihua, and Wang Huning. Compared to 2004, the Central Military Commission almost remained unchanged in 2007. The only new members were Wu Shangli (the PLA Navy commander), Xu Qiliang (the PLA Air Force commander), and Chang Wanquan (director of the General Armament Department).

Chapter 2 provides a brief analysis of characteristics of the Seventeenth Central Committee members in terms of education credentials, age, work experience, Party standing, home province, gender, and nationality. In comparison to the previous central committees, the Seventeenth Central Committee is the best educated. The benchmark was raised from a three-year college education in the previous central committees to a four-year college education for the current central committee, and those who received at least a four-year college education are more than 92 percent of the total. Moreover, those who have obtained graduate educations are quite common among the Seventeenth Central Committee members. More than half of them have graduate education, and more than 50 have PhDs. There are 31 people with study abroad experience and nine academicians. The Seventeenth Central Committee members were a bit older in 2007 than the Sixteenth Central Committee members in 2002, possibly due to continuity. The Cultural Revolution generation became more dominant among the Seventeenth Central Committee members, and Shandong and Hebei became top producers of central committee members instead of Jiangsu. Females and minorities remain minorities, and more are likely to have accumulated provincial leadership experience.

Chapter 3 evaluates the balance of power among formal institutions in the Seventeenth Central Committee. It creates a power index for each institution and depicts the power balance among the four formal institutions (provinces, central institutions, the military, and corporations) with these indices. Provincial units continue to be the most powerful institution in Chinese politics with the highest representation (or power) index. The central institutions rank the second, yet they are a combination of central Party institutions, central government institutions, and other central institutions. The military comes as the third. In addition to military officers on the Central Military Commission and general departments and services, military regions are all very well-represented. All political commissars and commanders of the seven military regions are full members of the Seventeenth Central Committee. Finally, corporate and academic leaders constitute an increasingly important yet still small part of the Seventeenth Central Committee.

Chapter 4 assesses the balance of power among factional groups and the group cohesion of factional groups. Out of the four major factional groups in Chinese politics, the Shanghai Gang declined drastically, from 17 members in the Sixteenth Central Committee to only nine members in the Seventeenth Central Committee. With the removal of Chen Liangyu as the Party secretary of Shanghai and the dismissal of Han Zheng as acting Party secretary, the Shanghai Gang's path to the Zhongnanhai has been cut off. The Qinghua Clique also declined, from 20 alumni in the Sixteenth Central Committee to 10 alumni in the Seventeenth Central Committee. But the Qinghua Clique's decline was mostly due to retirement, as most of Qinghua graduates in the central committee were in their 60s in 2007. The Princelings increased, from 20 members in the Sixteenth Central Committee to 26 in the Seventeenth Central Committee. Noticeably, there are seven princelings in the Politburo and nine princeling generals in the Seventeenth Central Committee. The Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL) Group, the largest factional group in the Sixteenth Central Committee with 57 members, further expanded to 82 in the Seventeenth Central Committee. In terms of the group cohesion index, the CCYL Group remained the

strongest; followed by the Princelings, the Shanghai Gang, and the Qinghua Clique.

Part II answers the “how” question. Chapter 5 analyzes a national crisis caused by the most serious snowstorms in the South in decades. The snowstorms were both misplaced and ill-timed. They were misplaced because they hit the southern provinces of China that are not used to frigid winters. Deep freezing in these provinces disrupted power generation and caused rail and highway paralyzes. They were ill-timed because they occurred during the Spring Festival season when billions were traveling home. They were also ill-timed because the State Council was in transition. Out of 10 original senior members, only two would be retained. Fortunately, the Politburo had been reconstituted and was poised to deal with the challenge. Under the leadership of the Politburo Standing Committee, China survived its first crisis in 2008.

Chapter 6 deals with the issue of Tibet in general and the March riots in particular. There are no controversies over the fact that Tibet is a part of China. But there are two different definitions of Tibet. For Beijing, Tibet refers to the Tibetan Autonomous Region (i.e., political Tibet). For the Dalai Lama, Tibet refers to regions of Tibetan residents (i.e., ethnic Tibet). There is also no consensus on when Tibet became a part of China. Beijing’s view is that Tibet has been a part of China since 1247. But Wang Lixiong’s view is that Tibet has been under Beijing’s direct rule since 1727 when the Qing court began to send resident ministers. Over the years since 1279 when the Mongols unified China, the central government of China has governed Tibet through different institutions and personalities. After the People’s Republic of China was founded in October 1949, successive leaders adopted different policies toward Tibet. Mao initially combined military campaigns with peaceful means to reinstall the central control over Tibet without much bloodshed. Under the 17-Article agreement between the Tibetan authorities under the Dalai Lama and the central government, Tibet was allowed to retain its religious, cultural, and social system. After the 1959 rebellion, however, the CCP conducted radical democratic reforms in Tibet, fundamentally transforming

the traditional system of Tibet. After the Cultural Revolution, Hu Yaobang introduced liberal policies, encouraging religious activities. But these policies soon backfired. Lhasa was embroiled in a series of unrests in the late 1980s. In the late 1980s, Beijing began to change its policy, focusing on economic development. Due to the differences over the selection of the 11th Panchen Lama, Beijing lost patience with the Dalai Lama and conducted a patriotic campaign in Tibet in the late 1990s. Apparently, six rounds of talks between Beijing and the Dalai Lama's personal representatives failed to produce any concrete results. Riots occurred in Lhasa and other Tibetan areas in March 2008. In the face of criticism from the Western media and some Western leaders, Beijing quickly restored the order in the troubled areas and made efforts to inform foreign leaders. In the meantime, the central government officials also conducted another round of talks with the Dalai Lama's personal representatives in Shenzhen.

Chapter 7 focuses on the Sichuan earthquake. Eight days after the Chinese government had a new talk with the Dalai Lama's private representatives, China faced another crisis. An earthquake measured at 8.0 on the Richter scale occurred on May 12, 2008 in Wenchuan County, Sichuan Province, leaving tens of thousands dead and millions homeless. It was the strongest earthquake in China since 1950 and the deadliest since 1976. The Chinese leadership sprang to action immediately. President Hu Jintao issued an order for rescue within one hour and Premier Wen Jiabao arrived at the earthquake-stricken site in less than five hours. After a Politburo Standing Committee meeting on the same day, the top leaders took turns to visit Sichuan and other affected provinces.

During the entire process of rescue and relief efforts, China was open, transparent, and effective. Instead of refusing assistance from other parts of the country as in the aftermath of the 1970 Tonghai earthquake or assistance from other countries as in the aftermath of the 1976 Tangshan earthquake, China in the aftermath of the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake welcomed domestic as well as foreign aid. Foreign donations came in from governments, businesses, and individuals. Foreign rescue teams from Japan, Russia, South Korea, and

Singapore were permitted to go to Sichuan. Foreign medical teams from Russia, Japan, Italy, Germany, France, Cuba, Pakistan, and Indonesia were allowed to work in the quake affected areas, and foreign military assistance from 18 countries was welcomed.

Chapter 8 studies the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games. For the Chinese, hosting an Olympic Games was a 100-year dream come true. For the Chinese leadership, that was China's coming-out party. Under the slogan, "One World One Dream", the Chinese leadership was initially determined to make the Beijing Olympics the best ever in the Olympic history. However, not everyone in this world shared Beijing's dream. Human rights groups, Tibetan separatists, and others also wanted to use the limelight of the Beijing Olympic Games to advance their own courses. They disrupted the torch relays in several Western cities, in particular Paris, offending not only the Chinese government but also the Chinese people around the world. The Chinese leadership modified its goal for the Olympics and made a "safe Olympics" one of its top priorities.

The Beijing 2008 Olympic Games, in the end, was indeed the best games ever in Olympic history. The opening ceremony was a grand display of Chinese civilization, filled with memorable moments. A dry evening at the site of the opening ceremony had been made possible by more than one thousand rain dispersal rockets; more than 110 world leaders were gathered in Beijing for the occasion; and 15,000 performers delivered a fantastic show. The Olympic venues are first-rate, high-tech, and environmentally friendly. More than 11,000 athletes from 204 countries and regions competed in 302 events in 34 sports. During the games, 38 world records and 85 Olympic records were set. The Chinese team collected 51 gold medals, No. 1 in the world, and 100 medals altogether. In addition to a "truly exceptional games", China subsequently hosted "the greatest Paralympic Games ever". As they had promised, these games were indeed "safe Olympics" as well as "green Olympics, high-tech Olympics, and people's Olympics".

Finally, the conclusion explores China's prospect for democratization. In a world of natural disasters and human upheavals, a government that actually governs is in demand. In spite of Francis

Fukuyama's proclamation 20 years ago that the Western liberal democracy represents the end of history as the best form of government, democracies increasingly suffer from a "lame duck phenomenon" where newly inaugurated democratic leaders are challenged by opposition leaders and protested by their voters for their inability to deliver. The Chinese government, in contrast, has proved to meet such a demand. In the face of natural disasters and human upheavals within one short year, the newly reconstituted leadership of the Chinese Communist Party overcame the challenges with high marks.

What then is the future of China's elite politics? Will China democratize? There are three possible trends for China's elite politics in the foreseeable future: institutionalization, factionalization, and democratization. If China continues its current trend of institutionalization, Xi Jinping, the heir apparent to Hu Jintao, would be a beneficiary. Continued institutionalization would facilitate another smooth political transition from the fourth generation leadership with Hu Jintao at helm to the fifth generation leadership with Xi Jinping as the leader. China's elite politics is also likely to become factionalized if and when factional groups are transformed into political factions. As both the Shanghai Gang and the Qinghua Clique have declined, real competition would occur between the Princelings and the CCYL Group. Finally, China is also likely to democratize. Although popular democracy is an eventual goal, intra-Party democratization is more likely in the near future.

NOTES

1. Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 1.
2. *Ibid.*
3. Isabel Martínez de Perón was the first female president of Argentina but she was not elected. She succeeded her husband, Juan Perón, as president of Argentina on July 1, 1974 after her husband's death.
4. "Losing friends fast", *The Economist*, July 18, 2008, http://www.economist.com/world/la/displayStory.cfm?story_id=11772229&source=features_box_main.

5. "The Kirchners v. the farmers", *The Economist*, March 27, 2008, http://www.economist.com/world/la/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10925670.
6. Choe Sang-Hun, "Protests in Seoul more about nationalism than beef", *International Herald Tribune*, June 11, 2008, <http://www.ihf.com/articles/2008/06/11/asia/seoul.php>.
7. "Lee's Approval Ratings Plunges to 17%", *KBS*, June 4, 2008, http://english.kbs.co.kr/news/newsview_sub.php?menu=2&key=2008060407.
8. For a perceptive analysis of democratic excesses in Asian democracies, see Jonathan Tepperman, "One Mob, One Vote", *Newsweek*, June 28, 2008, <http://www.newsweek.com/id/143660>.
9. "Top Thai court ousts PM Somchai", *BBC News*, December 2, 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7759960.stm>.
10. In a poll conducted by Princeton Survey Research Associates International from October 8–9, 2008 on behalf of *Newsweek*, 86 percent of adult Americans are dissatisfied with the way things are going in the United States and 10 percent of American citizens are "satisfied" (for the full poll results, see <http://www.newsweek.com/id/163337?tid=relatedcl>). Steve Tuttle, a journalist from *Newsweek*, found it incomprehensible that 10 percent of American citizens still continued to be "satisfied". "Who are these people?" he asked. "One in 10 Americans can't be repo men or Bush relatives. Satisfied? Now? Nobody's that Republican. Do these 10 percenters live in caves without TV, magazines, newspapers and the Internet — yet somehow still have a phone so that pollsters can reach them? And if you lived in a cave without HBO, would you really be 'satisfied'?" His anecdotal investigations among those "satisfied" yielded a drunkard, a really sweet couple (from Canada), and two America-lovers. For his article, see Steve Tuttle, "It's Just a Flesh Wound", *Newsweek*, October 11, 2008, <http://www.newsweek.com/id/163626>.
11. For details, see "Some Positive Signs for U.S. Image: Global Economic Gloom — China and India Notable Exceptions", *The Pew Global Attitudes Project*, June 12, 2008, <http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/260.pdf>.
12. For details, see http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/views_on_countriesregions_bt/488.php?lb=brglm&pnt=488&nid=&cid=
13. Due to the defeat in a by-election in Glasgow East on July 24, 2008, Gordon Brown is considered a lame duck. For details, see "The Race to Succeed Gordon Brown", *The Economist*, July 31, 2008, http://www.economist.com/world/britain/displayStory.cfm?source=hptextfeature&story_id=11848334.
14. Jonathan Tepperman, "Time of the Tough Guys", *The Newsweek*, June 16, 2008, <http://www.newsweek.com/id/141764>.
15. Jeffery M. Jones, "Confidence in Congress: Lowest Ever Any U.S. Institution", *Gallup*, June 20, 2008, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/108142/Confidence-Congress-Lowest-Ever-Any-US-Institution.aspx>.

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16. For a comparison with China, see William R. Hawkins, "Exclusive: Can Democracy Delivery the Goods?", *Family Security Matters*, July 16, 2008, http://www.familysecuritymatters.org/publications/id.619/pub_detail.asp.
17. For an insightful analysis, see Jonathan Tepperman, "Time of the Tough Guys", *Newsweek*, June 16, 2008, <http://www.newsweek.com/id/141764>.
18. *The Pew Global Attitudes Project*, June 12, 2008, p. 15.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
20. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-01/14/content_10658107.htm.
21. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6263325.stm>. For more details, see http://www.safe.gov.cn/model_safe/tjsj/tjsj_detail.jsp?ID=1104000000000000000,17&cid=5.
22. http://www.safe.gov.cn/model_safe/tjsj/tjsj_detail.jsp?ID=1104000000000000000,19&cid=5.
23. For a detailed analysis of China's problems, see Susan L. Shirk, *China: a Fragile Superpower* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).
24. For the literature on the thesis, see Edward Friedman, "China's North-South Split and the Forces of Disintegration", *Current History* 92 (1993): 270–274; Jack Goldstone, "The Coming Chinese Collapse", *Foreign Policy*, no. 99 (Summer 1995): 35–52; Minxin Pei, "Will China Become Another Indonesia?" *Foreign Policy*, no. 116 (Fall 1999): 94–109; and Gordon Chang, *The Coming Collapse of China* (New York: Random House, 2001).
25. Chang, *The Coming Collapse of China*, pp. 256–282.
26. Minxin Pei, *China's Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), p. 215.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 212.
28. *Ibid.*
29. Dali L. Yang, *Remaking the Chinese Leviathan: Market Transition and the Politics of Governance in China* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), p. 309.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 314.