by Charles Figuières (University of Bristol, UK) , Alain Jean-Marie (LIRMM, CNRS & University of Montpellier II, France) , Nicolas Quérou (INRA-LAMETA & University of Montpellier II, France) , & Mabel Tidball (INRA-LAMETA, France)

We have witnessed in recent years a revival of Conjectural Variations in Game Theory. This reincarnation of an old idea, using a dynamic point of view, aims at combining the adequacy with facts to the requirements of a firmly grounded theory.

This book presents, for the first time, a comprehensive account of conjectural variations equilibria in their static inceptions, featuring new comparative results of equilibria with regard to efficiency. It then describes several advances in Dynamic Game Theory, allowing to understand Conjectural Variations Equilibria as dynamic equilibria. The question of how conjectures evolve in strategic and learning situations with boundedly rational agents is also discussed.

• Static Conjectural Variations Equilibria: Initial Concepts
• Conjectures as Reduced Forms for Dynamic Interactions
• Consistent Conjectures in Dynamic Settings
• Dynamic Conjectures, Incomplete Information and Learning